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Abstract
We promote an engineering approach to design of provably se-
cure key exchange protocols. Using the model of Canetti and
Krawczyk we present a systematic method to arrive at efficient
and practical protocols with proven security and illustrate its
use with existing building blocks. We further show a dual ap-
proach which allows protocols with known features to be ‘re-
verse engineered’, thereby allowing easier security proofs and
providing new building blocks for future designs.
Keywords: Provable security, key exchange, secure
protocols.
1 Introduction
Protocols for key exchange provide the basis for se-
cure communications and so it is important that they
are designed correctly. However, despite their rela-
tive simplicity as measured by the number and size
of messages, experience has shown that informal ap-
proaches to protocol design frequently result in flawed
outcomes. Moreover, the modern approach to cryp-
tography demands more than an absence of known
attacks; a proof that security is equivalent to some
well understood problem is increasingly regarded as
essential.
Proofs for key exchange protocols were first pro-
vided by ?. Initially this only covered a two-party
example, but later the same authors (?) provided a
proof in the three party (server based) scenario, and
this was subsequently extended to a variety of other
settings. A feature of all these proofs is that they are
rather long and difficult to read for the non-specialist.
Perhaps more of a problem is that a small change in
the protocol may make the proof invalid and so it is
very difficult to re-use proofs or design protocols in
an incremental way.
? introduced the idea of a modular approach to
provable secure protocols. However, there were cer-
tain problems with their original security definitions
and ? re-used much of the earlier model with a new
definition of security. Although there are a few ex-
amples in these papers, they are mainly concerned
with explaining the formal models and proving that
the necessary building blocks are secure. One of the
aims of this paper is to make the approach of Canetti
and Krawczyk more accessible by giving more and de-
tailed examples and explaining how it can be used in
a systematic way. Because it is possible to use the
approach without a detailed knowledge of the formal
models and proofs, we believe that it is suitable for
application by practitioners.
The main contributions of this paper are the fol-
lowing.
• Detailed examples of use of Canetti-Krawczyk
approach to design of practical and secure pro-
tocols.
• A new method of using the Canetti-Krawczyk
model by inverting protocols with desirable prop-
erties, to allow a simplified proof.
• A new proven secure protocol in the ideal model
which can be used as a new building block for
protocol design.
The remainder of this paper is structured as fol-
lows. In section 2 we cover the background material
on the Canetti-Krawczyk model. Section 3 gives a
detailed example of use of the model with existing
building blocks. Section 4 explains how to use an ex-
isting protocols to extract a simple protocol in the
ideal world. including an example which lead to a
new proven secure protocol in the ideal world. Sec-
tion 5 describes other existing building blocks which
can be used for other protocol design. The appendix
contains a more formal description of the Canetti-
Krawzyk model and the proof of security for our new
protocol.
2 Background
This section provides a high level description of the
modular approach to the design of AKE protocols
(?, ?). More details on some elements of the model
appear in Appendix A.1.
2.1 Canetti-Krawczyk Approach to Protocol
Construction
The model defines protocol principals who may run
multiple sessions of the protocol. A powerful adver-
sary attempts to break the protocol by interacting
with the principals. In addition to controlling all the
communications the adversary is able to corrupt any
principal and choose its long-term key (this models
insider attacks). The adversary may also reveal any
accepted session keys. The adversary must be effi-
cient in the sense of being a probabilistic polynomial
time algorithm.
Definition 1 (Informal) An AKE protocol is called
SK-secure if the following hold.
1. If two uncorrupted parties complete matching
sessions, then they both accept the same key.
2. Suppose a session key is agreed between two un-
corrupted parties and has not been revealed by
the adversary. Then the adversary cannot dis-
tinguish the key from a random string with prob-
ability significantly more than 1/2.
Two adversarial models are defined. The first can
be considered as an ideal world in which messages are
authenticated magically. The second can be consid-
ered the real world in which we run our real protocols;
this is the model in which we want to prove our pro-
tocols secure. However, in order to modularise the
process protocols are first proven secure in the ideal
world and then translated into the real world.
The authenticated-links adversarial model (AM)
In this model the adversary is able to invoke
protocol runs, masquerade as protocol prin-
cipals, and find used session keys. Although
the adversary is quite powerful it is unable to
fabricate or replay messages which appear to
come from uncorrupted parties.
The unauthenticated-links adversarial model (UM)
In this model the adversary can do everything
that it can do in the AM, but can also replay
and fabricate messages using anything it can
calculate.
2.2 Authenticators
An MT-authenticator is an important mechanism in
the modularisation of the process. It is a transforma-
tion that applies to each message flow of a protocol
and emulate an AM SK-secure protocol in the UM.
The following gives an informal definition:
Definition 2 (Informal) An authenticator is a
protocol translator that takes an SK-secure protocol
in the AM to an SK-secure protocol in the UM. An
MT-authenticator (message transmission authentica-
tor) is an authenticator that is applied to each sepa-
rate message sent in the AM.
Secure Protocols
Secure Protocols
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Figure 1: Applying authenticator in Canetti-
Krawczyk model
Figure 1 illustrates how an authenticator provides
a connection between a protocol π in the UM and a
protocol π0 in the AM. Each flow of the protocol in
the AM will become a multi-flow sub-protocol in the
UM. The resultant secure protocol can be simply a
concatenation of all sub-protocols. However such a
simple approach generates an inefficient protocol and
is of limited interest to us despite its proven security.
Fortunately we can collapse flows of the sub-protocols
with only one assumption: the proof does not rely on
the sequence of the internal flows of a particular MT-
authenticator. The process is straightforward which
simply combines flows which will be sent to the same
direction.
2.3 Optimisation
Suppose that a 3-move MT-authenticator is applied
to a 2-move protocol in the AM. Then the resultant
protocol in the UM is the concatenation of 2 sub-
protocols which are denoted as λI and λR respec-
tively. Figures 2 and 3 show the direction of messages
sent in the sub-protocols.
A B
λI1−→
λI2←−
λI3−→
Figure 2: Sub-protocol One (λI)
A B
λR1←−−
λR2−−→
λR3←−−
Figure 3: Sub-protocol Two (λR)
The final protocol λIR is illustrated in Figure 4.
The first message of the λIR is a combination of λI1
together with λR2. The second message of the λIR is
formed by λI2 together with λR3. The third message
of the λIR is copied from λI3. The missing message
λR1 is implied in the second message of λIR so that
can be ignored, see remarks of (?).
A B
λI1, λR2
−−−−−→
λI2, λR3
←−−−−−
λI3−→
Figure 4: Final Protocol (λIR)
Remark. Sub-protocols cannot be collapsed using
the “mechanism” described above without any analy-
sis as the process is critical to security. It is important
to understand the type of message flows of any MT-
authenticator. In particular, the elements for forming
the message flows such as nonce, identity and secret
data. The final protocol must satisfy the format re-
quirements of the MT-authenticators, otherwise it is
likely to be insecure even if the assumption stands.
More precisely, it can be done via the following steps1:
1. Apply the mechanism without analysis.
This step involves mechanical work which sim-
ply collapses message flows to generate a 3-move
protocol from 2 3-move sub-protocols;
2. Identify redundant and replaceable elements of
message flows.
1It is important to note that our implementation requires both
parties to be involved for session identification. The session ID is
of a form of both inputs from the parties, but there is no restriction
on how it is achieved. More precisely, whether it is a hash or simply
a concatenation of the inputs does not matter. The only condition
is the involvement of the inputs.
This step is critical and requires understanding
and analysis of the authenticator. If A chooses x
at random, it can be used as a nonce generated
by A and as a challenge to B. Some information
is not required and can be marked as redundant
and removed later;
3. Substitute elements of message flows.
This step replaces redundant elements which are
often the nonce in the protocol used for freshness.
It is likely that some elements will become redun-
dant although they were necessary in the previous
step;
4. Remove redundant elements of message flows to
finalise the protocol.
This step simply removes the redundant elements
marked in the previous two steps;
5. Inspect the final protocol against the format re-
quirements of the MT-authenticator;
This step is a verification process which checks
the correctness of the final protocol.
2.4 Model Summary
We can now summarise the Canetti-Krawczyk ap-
proach in the following three steps.
1. Design a basic protocol and prove it is SK-secure
in the AM.
2. Design an MT-authenticator and prove that it is
a valid authenticator.
3. Apply the MT-authenticator to the basic proto-
col to produce a protocol that is automatically
secure in the UM.
4. As necessary, re-order and re-use message com-
ponents to optimise the resulting protocol.
3 Usage of MT-authenticator
In this section we demonstrate the usage of MT-
authenticators in the development of provably secure
protocols in detail. In particular, we apply the sig-
nature based MT-authenticator of ? to the protocol
named ENC of ? which is proven secure in the AM.
The signature based MT-authenticator is shown in
Figure 5; it is assumed that each party has its private
key and knows the authentic public keys of other par-
ties. The signature scheme in use is assumed to be
secure against chosen message attacks. Let m be any
message, NB be a nonce chosen by B and SigA() be
the signature of some arbitrary values generated by
A. Although the message m is shown in every flow, it
may actually occur in the first flow or even in the last
flow only. If more than one copy of the message m
exists in the authenticated version, some copies can
be eliminated but a unique session identifier must be
used to assure that the communication takes place in
the same session. The security proof of the authenti-
cator will fail if any of the three elements signed for
generating the signature in the last message is omit-
ted.
The protocol ENC is provably secure in the AM
with the assumption that the encryption scheme is
secure against chosen ciphertext attack and that the
hash function acts as a pseudorandom function. Its
security proof is presented by ?. Each party A pos-
sesses a pair (PKA, SKA) of encryption and decryp-
tion keys where PKA is public and all parties have
the public keys of other parties. The pseudorandom
function is denoted by {fa}a∈{0,1}b where b denotes
the security parameter.
A B
m−→
m,NB
←−−−−
m,SigA(m,NB , B)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 5: Signature Based MT-authenticator
A B
a ∈R {0, 1}
b
c = EPKB (a) A, s, c−−−→
(A′, a′) = DSKB (c)
K = fa(A,B, s) K
′ = fa′(A
′, B, s)
Figure 6: The Protocol ENC
3.1 The Authenticated Protocol ENCUM
Since the protocol ENC is a single message proto-
col in the AM, applying the signature based MT-
authenticator to the protocol is straightforward and
no collapsing needs to be done. Simply substitute
m in the authenticator by the message (A, s, c), then
the protocol is authenticated and is provably secure in
the UM. This is related to step 1 of the optimisation
process and requires no analysis.
We then need to follow steps 2 to 5 of the optimi-
sation process to obtain the resultant protocol. The
only replaceable element of the protocol is s. The
only erasable element is A in the third message as we
have already presented the identity of A in the first
message. We now replace the session ID s with inputs
from both parties 2 and is replaced by (c,NB) where
c and NB denote contributions from A and B respec-
tively. Furthermore, we remove the identity of A in
the third message and finally, we inspect the correct-
ness of the protocol against the format requirements
of the signature based MT-authenticator. The au-
thenticated and simplified protocol ENCUM is shown
in Figure 7 which is an optimised version of the result
after applying the MT-authenticator to the protocol
ENC.
4 Extraction of SK-secure Protocol
Up until now, we have demonstrated the modular
approach for developing protocols with provable se-
curity by applying MT-authenticators to SK-secure
protocols in the AM to obtain SK-secure protocols in
the UM. One way to be more productive (in terms
of number of SK-secure protocols in the UM) is by
increasing the number of SK-secure protocols in the
AM in our collection.
On the one hand, we can design our own protocols
which are SK-secure in the AM from scratch. On
the other hand, we can extract SK-secure protocols
in the AM from some existing protocols that we want
to prove secure. One of the major advantages of the
latter method is that we actually know the outcome
protocol in the UM. It is ideal in scenarios where a
protocol is found to be well suited for some task, then
one can extract the SK-secure protocol in the AM
by ‘reverse engineering’ the authenticator, and put it
in the collection of building blocks for new provably
secure protocols in the UM.
2It is also valid if only one party proposes a session ID for a
session, however it is advisable to form a session ID with inputs
from both parties.
A B
a ∈R {0, 1}
b
c = EPKB (a) A, c−−→
c,NB
←−−−
c,NB , SigA(A, c,NB , B)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(A′, a′) = DSKB (c)
K = fa(A,B, s) K
′ = fa′(A
′, B, s)
Figure 7: The Authenticated Protocol ENCUM
We demonstrate the extraction methodology by
providing an example where we gain a new proto-
col which is SK-secure in the AM from the proto-
col named 3PKDUM which was proven secure by
?. For the sake of simplicity, the message routing
of the first two messages has been modified from
A→ B → S to A→ S ← B as illustrated in Figure 8.
? suggested that “protocols for alternative connectiv-
ity model ought differ only in their message routing”,
but not their security.
The protocol involves three parties (see (?) for
a two-party protocol), a trusted server S and two
players A and B. It is a key distribution proto-
col where the session key is generated by the server
S using a session key generator Sn with input 1k
where k denotes the security parameter. Party A
shares a pair of symmetric keys (SKAS ,MKAS) [resp.
(SKBS ,MKBS) for party B] with the server S for en-
cryption and message authentication. These keys are
generated by a long term key generator LKG(1k, r)
which returns a uniformly distributed 2k-bit string
value where r is a random number. Let w be the
length in bits where random numbers rA and rB are
chosen. Note that rA and rB are used to provide se-
mantic security (?) and we preserve them here so
that our result matches exactly as Figure 8.
4.1 Extraction Mechanism
The first step towards extraction of AM protocols
out of existing protocols is to understand the pro-
tocol properly in terms of service provision. More
precisely, we want to identify the part of the protocol
which is responsible for confidentiality as well as the
part which provides authentication. We recall that
the model (?) separates the treatment for confiden-
tiality and authentication.
After identifying the type of services provided by
the protocol, we also need to be familiar with the ways
that how those services are carried out, namely using
a secure encryption scheme for session key protection.
This step intends to be more directive in identifying
the type of authenticators that may be used for em-
ulating SK-secure protocols in the UM.
The last step is to remove unnecessary elements
of the protocol such as random nonce and elements
providing authentication which is not dealt with in
the AM.
As an example, we identify that the protocol
3PKDUM provides both confidentiality and authen-
tication services. In the flows from the server S to A
and B, ESKAS (·) and ESKBS (·) provide confidential-
ity services while MACMKAS (·) and MACMKBS (·)
provide authentication services. The former aims to
protect secrecy of the session key σ and prevent leak-
age of session key information to the adversary and
the latter indents to provide assurance of party iden-
tity as well as message authentication.
We then notice that the protocol uses symmetric
key encryption scheme which requires a long term se-
cret key to be distributed securely before the protocol
execution. The MAC function serves as an ordinary
keyed MAC. The use of the MAC function suggests
the use of a MAC based authenticator. We describe
such an authenticator of ? in Figure 9.
A B
NB←−
m,MACAB(B,NB ,m)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 9: MAC Based MT-authenticator
The removal of redundant elements is easy and
straightforward. Almost at all times, random nonces
can be safely deleted as random nonces are likely to
be part of the authenticators. We then remove oper-
ations related to MAC as authentication is assumed
in the AM.
4.2 New SK-secure Protocol in the AM
Following the approach described above, we extract a
protocol which is a candidate to be SK-secure in the
AM and is illustrated in Figure 10. Without proving
its security, we verify the correctness of the protocol
structure by applying the MAC based authenticator
to the protocol 3PKD. The resultant protocol should
be similar to protocol 3PKDUM. If it is not the case,
the protocol may need to be fine tuned, or it may
serve just as well as the original depending on the
requirements.
We note that the resultant protocol after apply-
ing the MAC based authenticator to protocol 3PKD
needs to be adjusted so that the message routing
matches the one in protocol 3PKDUM. The partner
identity is added to get the identical result comparing
with 3PKDUM in the flows from S to A and B.
Once the structure is confirmed, we need to prove
that it is SK-secure in the AM. This critical step
requires knowledge regarding the operation of the
Canetti-Krawczyk model. However, even though this
step may not be straightforward for many praction-
ers, two important factors make the effort more at-
tractive. Firstly, the effort involved is greatly reduced
in comparison with the full proof in the UM, such as
was carried out by Bellare and Rogaway. Secondly,
once proven secure in the AM the protocol may be
re-used with other authenticators, thereby helping to
build up the library of proven secure protocols.
The security of the protocol 3PKD can be reduced
to the security of the encryption scheme which is used
to protect the session key. Formally, we state it in
Theorem 1. The proof of the theorem appears in Ap-
pendix A.2.
A S B
NA−→
NB←−
σ(session key) = Sn(1k)
rA, rB ∈R {0, 1}
w
µA = ESKAS (σ, rA)
µB = ESKBS (σ, rB)
νA =MACMKAS (A,B,NA, µA)
νB =MACMKBS (A,B,NB , µB)
µA, νA
←−−−−
µB , νB
−−−−→
verify νA verify νB
σ′ = DSKAS (µA) σ
′′ = DSKBS (µB)
Figure 8: The Protocol 3PKDUM
A S B
σ(session key) = Sn(1k)
rA, rB ∈R {0, 1}
w
µA = ESKAS (σ, rA)
µB = ESKBS (σ, rB)
µA, B
←−−−
µB, A
−−−→
σ′ = DSKAS (µA) σ
′′ = DSKBS (µB)
Figure 10: The Protocol 3PKD
Theorem 1 If the long and short term keys (SKi, σ)
are uniformly distributed, the symmetric encryption
scheme (LKG,E,D) is semantically secure and the
server S leaks no information regarding the keys SKi,
then the protocol 3PKD is SK-secure in the authenti-
cated links model (AM).
5 Additional Building Blocks
As a practical solution for secure protocol design and
development using the Canetti-Krawczyk model, one
needs as many building blocks as possible. We col-
lect a SK-secure protocol in the AM and a proven
secure authenticator and present them here as addi-
tional building blocks to be used in practical circum-
stances. These building blocks are not used through-
out this paper, but they are as useful as those that are
used. More importantly, one does not need to know
the proof technique for building secure protocols as
all building blocks presented here have already been
proven secure.
5.1 A SK-secure Protocol in the AM
The well-known Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol, Fig-
ure 11, is SK-secure in the AM under the decision
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption (?). We use the
common notation for the description of the protocol
as follows: Z∗p denotes the multiplicative group of in-
tegers modulo a prime p, G denotes a cyclic subgroup
of prime order q and a generator g. Public knowledge
includes the values (g, p, q). All arithmetic is per-
formed in Z∗p unless indicated otherwise.
This protocol features some desirable properties
such as forward secrecy and has been extended to
be SK-secure in the UM (?) using the signature
based authenticator. An important consideration
when choosing an appropriate SK-secure protocol in
the AM as a building block is to consider the demands
of additional protocol properties apart from security.
Pi Pj
x ∈R Zq y ∈R Zq
Pi, s, g
x
−−−−−→
Pj , s, g
y
←−−−−−
K ′ = (gy)x K = (gx)y
Figure 11: The Protocol DH
5.2 An Encryption Based MT-authenticator
The encryption based authenticator (?) uses public
key encryption and a MAC scheme. A fundamental
assumption is that the MAC is secure and the public
key encryption scheme is semantically secure against
chosen ciphertext attack (?, ?). The authenticator is
presented in Figure 12.
A B
m−→
m,EPKA(NB)←−−−−−−−−−−
m,MACNB (m,B)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 12: Encryption Based MT-authenticator
We may use this authenticator in the same way
as the two other MT-authenticators in this paper,
namely the signature (Figure 5) and MAC based MT-
authenticator (Figure 9). When choosing which au-
thenticator should be used, one needs to understand
the assumptions being made behind the security and
the type of services that need to be provided.
5.3 Mixed Use of MT-authenticators
In order to extend the usage of authenticators, we ar-
gue that it is valid to use more than one authenticator
in the same protocol. For example, we may apply the
signature based MT-authenticator to the first mes-
sage of the protocol DH while using the encryption
based MT-authenticator to emulate the second mes-
sage in the UM. Of course to do this the protocol in
the AM must consist of at least two message flows.
The proofs of the MT-authenticators are focused
on the emulation of an AM message in the UM. More
precisely, a SK-secure protocol in the AM is formed
by one or more messages which are individually con-
verted to messages in the UM. Such an approach pre-
serves the possibility of applying different treatments
to messages of protocols.
The steps for applying different MT-
authenticators to a SK-secure protocol in the
AM are the same as those for using a single MT-
authenticator. This technique facilitates the increase
in the number of protocols which are SK-secure in
the UM.
6 Conclusion
We have demonstrated the usefulness of a formal
modular approach for secure protocol design in a
practical way without the need to understand the
deatiled proof technique. The idea is to collect SK-
secure protocols in the AM and MT-authenticators,
then apply the MT-authenticators to the SK-secure
protocols in the AM to obtain SK-secure protocols
in the UM. We note that it is possible to use differ-
ent MT-authenticators for different message flows of
protocols.
We have also demonstrated the technique for ex-
traction of SK-secure protocol in the AM from a pro-
tocol, in particular a three-party key distribution pro-
tocol. The number of SK-secure protocol in the AM
may be greatly increased as there are a large number
of protocols which have been published. Of course,
this technique demands the ability to prove the SK-
security of the newly extracted protocol.
In conclusion, three SK-secure protocols in the AM
have been demonstrated, one of which is new and
proven to be SK-secure in the AM. Three authenti-
cators have been collected, one of which is used for
generating a new SK-secure protocol in the UM.
References
A Security Proof
A.1 Model Description
Before we prove Theorem 1, we describe in more de-
tail some elements of ? model, which are needed to
understand the proof.
The execution of a key-exchange (KE) protocol is
modelled as a collection of n programs each running
at a different party. Each program can fork multiple
sub-processes to handle multiple session of a proto-
col run. All communications between parties occur
through the adversary A, which has different capabil-
ities depending on which of the two adversarial mod-
els (AM or UM) we are considering. In what follows
we only concern ourselves with AM-adversaries. Fur-
thermore, we do not consider forward secrecy, since it
is not needed in our proof.
A KE protocol π can be activated at each party
Pi in two ways:
1. By means of an establish− session(Pi, Pj , s, role)
request, where Pj is other party with whom the
key is to be established, s is a session-id string
which uniquely identifies a session , and role can
be either initiator or responder.
2. By means of an incoming messagem with a spec-
ified sender Pj
We say that two sessions are matching, if in an
execution of the protocol, party Pi has a session with
input (Pi, Pj , s, role) and party Pj has a session with
input (Pj , Pi, s
′, role ′) and s = s′.
In addition to the activation of parties, the adver-
sary can performed the following actions:
1. A may issue a session− key query, which returns
the session key (if any) accepted during a given
session.
2. A may issue a session− state query, which re-
turns the all the internal state information asso-
ciated to a particular session.
3. A may issue a test− session query. To respond
to this query, a random bit b ∈R {0, 1} is se-
lected. If b = 0 then the session key is returned.
Otherwise, a random key chosen from the prob-
ability distribution of keys generated by the pro-
tocol is output. This query can only be issued
to a session that has not been exposed, i.e that
has not been the subject of a session− state or
session− key queries, and whose involved parties
have not been corrupted.
Once the adversary performs a test− session
query, the adversary is not allowed to expose the test-
session. Eventually A outputs a bit b′ and halts.
Definition 3 A KE protocol π is called SK-secure
without perfect forward secrecy in the AM if the
following two properties are satisfied for any AM-
adversary A.
1. Protocol π satisfies the property that if two uncor-
rupted parties complete matching sessions then
they both output the same key; and
2. the probability that A guesses correctly the bit b
is no more than 1
2
plus a negligible fraction in the
security parameter.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Since the protocol 3PKD is a key transport protocol,
it is easy to see that both parties A and B are in pos-
session of the same session key upon the completion
of the protocol execution and satisfies the first condi-
tion of SK-security. This proof mainly concentrates
on proving that the second condition of SK-security
can be achieved.
In order to prove the satisfaction of the second
condition, we will define a couple of algorithms. Let
A be an adversary against the protocol 3PKD and X
an experimental machine simulating the execution of
the protocol.
We assume that the advantage of the adversary
A in distinguishing between a session key and a ran-
dom value is with a non-negligible probability ǫ and
show that if A breaks the SK-security of the proto-
col, then the X can break the semantic security of the
encryption scheme (LKG,E,D) with non-negligible
probability and reaching contradiction to Lemma 1.
In addition to the assistance of the algorithms de-
scribed above, we need the following result to capture
the fact that an adversary can get extra information
by observation of α and β where the same session key
is encrypted using different long term keys. This is a
special case of a more general result of ?.
Lemma 1 (?) If (LKG,E,D) is a secure encryp-
tion scheme, then any multiple eavesdropper has neg-
ligible advantage.
The inputs to X include strings σ0, σ1, one of
which is the session key chosen according to Sn
while the other is a random value of the same
length of the session key. X also takes inputs α =
ESKAS (σx, rA), β = ESKBS (σx, rB) and has access to
the encryption oracles ESKAS (·) and ESKBS (·).
We note that the keys SKAS , SKBS are gener-
ated by the server S using LKG, x ∈R {0, 1} and
rA, rB ∈R {0, 1}
w.
We then proceed as follows:
1. Machine X sets up a virtual scenario for the run
of protocol 3PKD and activates A against the
virtual run. The adversary A has full control of
the communication channels and is responsible
to schedule all operations. The scheduled oper-
ations are perform by X that works on behalf
of all virtual players (including S) in the virtual
scenario for the run of protocol 3PKD;
2. At setup stage, X chooses randomly a pair of
players (A,B) ∈R {1, ..., n} where n denotes the
maximum number of players can be invoked and
picks u ∈R {1, ..., l} where l denotes the maxi-
mum number of sessions. We assume that the
chosen session is (A,B, S, u). That is, the in-
volved players are parties A, B and the server
S which is used for session key generation and
distribution amongst all parties;
3. When A invokes a new party Pi ∈ {1, ..., n} \
{A,B}, then X selects at random a shared en-
cryption key SKi between the party and the
server by using the long term key generator
LKG. If the new party is A (resp. B), its
long term encryption key is SKAS (resp. SKBS).
Note that neither X nor A knows the keys, but
X has access to the encryption oracles ESKAS (·)
and ESKBS (·);
4. In the beginning of the virtual run, it proceeds
as follows:
• X (on behalf of S) sends µi to party Pi 6= A
together with the identity of the partnering
party Pj 6= B of the session;
• It then sends µj to party Pj 6= B together
with the identity of its partner Pi 6= A;
• If Pi = A (resp. B), it sends µi = α (resp.
β) to Pi where α (resp. β) is generated by
the server S which has access to the oracle
ESKAS (·) (resp. ESKBS (·));
• Continue the simulation as A pleases until
all sessions are activated;
5. During the experiment, all attacks against the
session (Pi, Pj , S, s) 6= (A,B, S, u) and its partic-
ipants are answered by X using its knowledge of
keys. If a session reveal is scheduled against the
session u, a corruption against A or B, or a dif-
ferent test session (Pi, Pj , S, s) 6= (A,B, S, u) is
chosen, X aborts the run of A and outputs a bit
x′ ∈R {0, 1};
6. If A decides to query the test session u, X flips
a coin for the value of x′ ∈R {0, 1}. If x
′ = 0, X
returns σ0, otherwise σ1;
7. If A halts and outputs a bit x′, then X halts and
outputs a bit x′ too;
8. Now, we calculate the overall probability with
which X can succeed against the virtual proto-
col run in distinguishing a session key from a
random nonce. Firstly, the probability is 1/2
in the case where A is aborted. Secondly, the
probability that A selects the correct test ses-
sion is 1/[ln(n − 1)]. Thirdly, the probabil-
ity that A breaks the SK-security of the proto-
col is non-negligible (by assumption) over 1/2.
Thus, the overall advantage of X for breaking
the semantic security of the encryption scheme
is 1/2 + ǫ/[ln(n− 1)] which is non-negligible.
